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Comments
The Constitutional Aspects of
Restricting Business Closures
In the summer of 1982, California Assemblywoman Maxine Waters
proposed a controversial bill called the Employment Stabilization Act'
(hereinafter E.S.A.) that, if passed, would have greatly reduced the
freedom of large businesses to relocate or shutdown.2 The E.S.A. re-
sponds strongly to the increasing number of business closures in Cali-
fornia by requiring large businesses before reducing their operations to
give twelve months notice to their employees,3 to offer a choice to the
workers of severance pay4 or a transfer to another California workplace
without loss of benefits accrued over the employees' years of labor,5
and to pay a fee6 and turn over financial records7 to the Department of
Industrial Relations (hereinafter referred to as the D.I.R.) for its use in
developing alternatives to closing and options for the displaced work-
ers. Proponents of the E.S.A. believe that the social problems caused
by business dislocations should be addressed by the businesses respon-
sible for the layoffs.' One consequence of the increased responsibility
for displaced workers is the discouragement of business mobility, thus
preventing the problems caused by plant closures from occurring in ad-
dition to providing relief after the fact.'
I. A.B.2839, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1981-82 (as amended in Assembly May 28, 1982) (at-
tempt to add part 5 to Division 2 of the California Labor Code beginning with section 1450)
[hereinafter referred to as A.B. 2839 and Labor Code section sought to be added].
2. See Arnold, Existing and Proposed Regulation of Business Dislocations, 57 U. DEr. .
URB. L. 209,234 (1980). The E.S.A. did not survive in the Assembly this year. Nevertheless, since
the California legislature is likely to confront a similar bill in the future, see infra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text, and since the Comment is using the E.S.A. as a hypothetical to examine the
constitutionality of this sort of legislation, id., the E.S.A. will generally be referred to as if pres-
ently enacted in order to facilitate the discussion. Occasionally, sections will be footnoted to re-
mind the reader that the author is aware that the E.S.A. is not the law.
3. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
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This inhibitory result of the E.S.A. raises several interesting issues
such as: the economic ramifications of placing the social costs of busi-
ness dislocation on the businesses responsible for those costs;1° the
question of whether corporations should be forced to operate in the
best interests of the workers and their communities when to do so
would conflict with the interests of corporate shareholders; and the rel-
ative merit of the E.S.A. when compared with European and Japanese
industry standards for dealing with business mobility.1 I A more funda-
mental consideration, however, is whether a state may take measures
similar to those proposed in the E.S.A. to regulate business movement
without contravening the United States Constitution. Arguments have
been made that restrictions similar to those imposed by the E.S.A. of-
fend the Commerce Clause,' 2 the Contract Clause,' 3 and the Taking
Clause. 4 Should any of these arguments prove to be insurmountable,
the potential social benefit of legislation like the E.S.A. would become
irrelevant. This comment will demonstrate that the Commerce Clause,
Contract Clause, and Taking Clause obstacles can be cleared by the
type of legislation exemplified by the E.S.A.
The initial constitutional hurdle, the Commerce Clause, will be over-
come by first showing that the E.S.A. does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce. 5 Then, the Commerce Clause balancing test will
be shown to weigh in favor of the strong local interests promoted by the
E.S.A.'s restrictions' 6 since the E.S.A. burdens California enterprises
more than out-of-state enterprises,'" a factor reducing the level of judi-
cial scrutiny. 8 A different theoretical approach to the Commerce
Clause issue indicating that the Commerce Clause should not apply to
legislation like the E.S.A. will conclude this constitutional section.' 9
To rebut the Contract Clause argument, the E.S.A. will be distin-
guished from the legislation invalidated in the central Contract Clause
case, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus.2 ° The distinctions should al-
low the E.S.A. to avoid the close scrutiny applied by the United States
10. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at 5, cols. 1-2.
11. See generally, Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1394, 1458-59 (1970) (on the differing historical development of countries leading
to different methods of regulating business).
12. Arnold, supra note 2, at 251-53.
13. Id at 242-45.
14. Id at 247-51. Possible Equal Protection arguments will not be discussed because the
rational relationship test for economic legislation is easily overcome. See id at 245-47.
15. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101-120 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 1-16-117 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
20. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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Supreme Court in Allied.2 In addition, the minority approach, which
opposes application of the Contract Clause to regulations like the
E.S.A., will be analyzed because the recent change in the composition
of the United States Supreme Court renders suspect the continuing vi-
tality of the Allied majority approach.22
Finally, the Taking Clause objection will be answered by demon-
strating that the notice requirement is not a taking as this term is cur-
rently understood by the Supreme Court.23 The ultimate question in
determining whether or not a taking has occurred is on whom should
the cost of regulations fall?24 This comment will show that for legis-
lation like the E.S.A., the cost should be borne by large businesses that
aggravate the problems that layoffs cause by refusing to take any re-
sponsibility for their former employees.25  Furthermore, a statutory
modification will be proposed to protect the interests of the employees
without unduly interfering with the interests of management, thus
avoiding the taking issue altogether.2 6
By answering the constitutional questions, this comment strives to
pave the way for others to analyse the desirability of restraining man-
agement's ability to reduce business operations regardless of employ-
ees' need to hold on to their jobs during the current period of high
unemployment.2 7 The E.S.A. will be used for the constitutional analy-
sis because the E.S.A.'s provisions clearly invite scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, and Taking Clause.28 The E.S.A.
resembles bills that have been proposed in other states attempting to
bring about similar business regulations; 29 therefore, the E.S.A. serves
as a concrete example of its legislative genre. Although this type of
legislation has been passed only in Maine,3" the number of proposals in
other states31 and the fact that an earlier version of the bill was pro-
posed in California 32 indicate that debate over restricting business
movement will continue in future legislative sessions. To sharpen the
focus of the constitutional arguments, the restrictions of the E.S.A.
must be more fully illuminated.
21. See infra notes 145-201 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 203-213 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 225-256 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 257-265 and accompanying text.
27. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 7, 1982, at 1, cols. 5-6.
28. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 242-45, 247-53.
29. See id at 229-34.
30. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.26, §625-B.
31. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 229-34.
32. See S.B. 1494, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1979-80; S.B. 1114, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1980-81.
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THE PROVISIONS OF THE E.S.A.
The E.S.A. applies to large nonexempted California businesses33 that
significantly reduce their operations. 34 The terms of any lawful collec-
tive bargaining agreement prevail should they conflict with any part of
the E.S.A.35 Accordingly, the E.S.A. has a broad impact since its provi-
sions apply to most large private busines.ses without a union agreement
covering plant closures.3 6 In addition, a possible side effect of the
E.S.A. is to give unions greater bargaining leverage on the issue of re-
ceiving benefits in the event of a shutdown because the alternative to
reaching a voluntary agreement would have been compliance with the
terms of the E.S.A.37
The specific requirements of the E.S.A. are as follows. For any cov-
ered businesses to reduce their operations over the permitted amount,
notice must be given twelve months in advance.38 The notice must go
to all of the employees at the affected workplace,39 the labor organiza-
tion, if any, representing those employees, 40 the elected officials of the
community where the reduction of operations will occur,4 1 and the
D.I.R.4 2 The notice must contain specific references identifying the
workplace to be closed,4 3 reasons for the closure,44 an estimate of the
length of the closure,4 5 the number of employees to be laid off,4 6 and a
description of all employee rights and benefits under the terms of any
existing collective bargaining agreements or company personnel poli-
cies.47 The penalty for failure to provide adequate notice under the
E.S.A. is a maximum of $10,000 per affected employee;4 however,
33. The E.S.A. covers businesses employing an average of 300 employees during the preced-
ing twelve months, A.B. 2839, supra note 1, §1452(c), or other employers with an average of 2,000
employees nationwide, and 50 at a single plant in California, during the previous year. Id The
E.S.A. exempted businesses closed due to labor disputes, id §1453(a), the seasonal or temporary
nature of the job, id §1453(d), or the job site, id §1453(c), bankruptcy, id §1453(e), and any
businesses run by the state or local government. Id §1453(b).
34. A reduction in operations of 15 workers or 25 percent of the workforce, whichever is
greater, triggered the E.S.A. Id §1452(f).
35. Id §1464(f).
36. See id That most unions have not exacted an agreement concerning plant closures can
be inferred from the vociferous union support of the E.S.A. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at
5, cols. 1-2. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the status of the E.S.A.
37. See A.B. 2839, supra note 1, §1464(t).
38. Id §1460(b).
39. Id §1460(a)(1).
40. Id §1460(a)(2).
41. Id §1460(a)(3).
42. Id §1460(a)(4).
43. Id §1460(c)(1).
44. Id §1460(c)(2).
45. Id §1460(c)(3).
46. Id §1460(c)(4).
47. Id §1460(c)(5).
48. Id §1471(a).
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there is an exception for unplanned reductions in operations. 9 Where
a layoff becomes a reduction of operations as defined by the E.S.A., or
if any other unforeseen event causes a reduction of operations, notice
must be provided not later than ten days after the reduction in opera-
tions begins." Failure to notify the correct parties on time in accord-
ance with this exception may result in a fine of up to $1,000 per affected
employee.51
After the businesses comply with the notice requirement, the E.S.A.
mandates that they make a good faith offer to sell at fair market value
any plant closing completely or relocating. 2 Also, operating and
financial records relating to the affected work sites of the businesses
must be disclosed to the D.I.R. for use in its investigative and planning
activities.53 The E.S.A. requires closing businesses to pay the D.I.R. a
fee to defray the costs incurred by that body in fulfilling its obligations
under the E.S.A. 4
A more significant expense than the payment of the fee to the D.I.R.
is the choice between two severance benefit plans that the E.S.A. forces
businesses to offer to their displaced employees. 5 Of the two plans, the
one demanding severance pay equal to the wages for one work week
for each completed year of service before the reduction in operations
plus a bonus of the same amount for every five years of employment
probably costs businesses more money.56 The alternative method pro-
vides for permanent preference rights in hiring and employment at the
employer's other California business operations with no loss of previ-
ously earned health, welfare, pension, and vacation benefits.57 Al-
though this alternative costs more than beginning with workers to
whom no benefits have accrued, it merely continues previous commit-
ments to employees rather than imposing new obligations. The prefer-
ence rights in hiring and continued benefits, however, are accompanied
by a section which does impose new obligations in the form of a reloca-
49. Id §1460(d).
50. Id
51. Id §1471(b).
52. Id §1463(b). The offer must be made to the surrounding community and the displaced
workers, and must be held open for 50 days. Id
53. Id §1463(a).
54. The fee is $1,500. Id §1461. The D.I.R.'s responsibilities include studying the viability.
of a community owned business, id §1462(d)(2), investigating possible avenues available to the
plant to avoid closing, id §1462(b)(1), convening a meeting of community political and financial
leaders with the representatives of the plant and the workers in order to plan a way to reduce the
unemployment caused by the reduction in operations, id §1462(c)(1), (2), and preparing a state-
ment detailing the predicted economic and social impact of the closure. Id §1462(d)(3).
55. Id §1464(a), (b).
56. Id §1464(b). A week's pay is measured by 40 hours straight time at the employee's regu-
lar wage rate. Id The employer must pay every affected worker a minimum of three weeks'
wages computed in this manner. Id
57. Id §1464(a).
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tion fee.5" The relocation fee still should do less violence to company
coffers in most cases than the severance pay because under the former,
the employer must pay a maximum of $500 to each worker who accepts
a transfer to a new site that is more than forty miles from his home.5 9
Another company expense arises from the requirement of the E.S.A.
that the employers continue paying their share of premiums on all em-
ployee health and insurance benefit plans in existence before the reduc-
tion in business operations. 60 The payments must continue for a year
unless the worker finds new health and insurance benefits through
other employment prior to the expiration of the twelve month period.61
The combined effect of these statutorily imposed expenses will prompt
management to avoid business shutdowns or relocations if there is a
less costly alternative.62 As demonstrated above, the requirements of
the E.S.A. are many and burdensome, but it does not inexorably follow
that they are unconstitutional. The discussion of the constitutionality
of the E.S.A. will begin with the Commerce Clause.
THE EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION ACT AND
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The portions of the E.S.A. raising Commerce Clause issues are those
which curtail the option of businesses to relocate. More specifically,
the requirement of twelve months notice on penalty of a heavy fine, 63
and the option of severance pay for all displaced workers64 or prefer-
ence in hiring with no loss of earned benefits at a new location,65 im-
pede decisions to relocate because of the time restraints of the former
and the cost of the latter. In some cases, the notice requirement could
prove costly as well because a good deal of information is demanded
for a potentially large number of people.66 The costs and delays placed
on California businesses lead to a fundamental Commerce Clause in-
quiry, that is, is the E.S.A. a protectionist measure and therefore
invalid?
58. Id §1464(c).
59. Id The $500 or less compensates the employee for the movement of household goods,
transportation to the new location for the employee and any dependents, and fees and costs associ-
ated with obtaining a new residence. Id
60. Id §1464(e).
61. Id
62. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 234.
63. See supra notes 38.48 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
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A. The Employment Stabilization Act Is Not a Protectionist Measure
as Protectionism Is Interfpreted by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, acting as a champion of free trade,67 tradition-
ally has opposed protectionist measures that isolate the trade of a state
from the rest of the union.6" The protectionism inherent in the E.S.A.,
however, differs from that typically found to be invalid.69 The E.S.A.
does not impede the flow of goods to and from the state7° or prevent
non-California industries from sharing equal access to the California
market;7' rather, the E.S.A. gives California workers preferred rights to
their jobs over any new employees, without prohibiting a change in the
work force by the company. This preference does not erect a barrier to
trade or discriminate by burdening out-of-state industry without also
burdening industry within the state;72 instead, it places the burden of
helping California employees on local businesses. 73 The former prac-
tices have consistently been found to be inimical to free trade and
therefore protectionist and invalid,74 but this is not true of restrictions
placed exclusively on local enterprises.75
The only anticompetitive effect of the E.S.A. outside of California is
the loss to other states of speculative benefits due to the inhibition of
movement caused by the increased expense.76 The benefit is specula-
tive because it depends upon the economic condition of a business
when it relocates. Even if a highly successful business were to move,
the benefit would not be inevitable because a proclivity by manage-
ment for reaping short term profits could lead to swift changes in loca-
tion and production needs, thus causing the same problems elsewhere
that the E.S.A. purports to remedy. The benefit to other states surely
must be considered minimal when contrasted with the certain harm
caused to California by a business dislocation without this type of
worker protection. The E.S.A. inhibits competition only for existing
67. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L. J. 425, 428 (1982).
68. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
539 (1949); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
69. E.g., note 68 supra.
70. For an example of a case when impeding the flow of goods from state to state was not
tolerated, see Hood, 336 U.S. at 539.
71. For an example of a case where denying equal access to a state market was not tolerated,
see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
72. See generally A.B.2839, supra note 1. Opponents of the E.S.A. contend that the problem
with the E.S.A. is that it burdens California businesses excessively to the advantage of out-of-state
competition. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at 5, cols. 1-2.
73. See id
74. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351; Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice 434 U.S. 429,
447 (1978), City of Philadelhia 437 U.S. at 626-27; Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27, 42 (1980).
75. See, e.g., note 74 supra (in none of these cases was burdening local businesses a factor).
76. But see Arnold, supra note 2, at 253.
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California businesses,77 and does not prevent successful companies
from starting new branches elsewhere. In addition, critics of the E.S.A.
contend that California will be disadvantaged in the competition for
new businesses,78 so the effect on the economies of other states should
not be severe.
Moreover, the commercial interests of other states are not greatly in-
fringed upon by the E.S.A.'s protection of California workers. While
the goal of protecting local workers has been rejected before as a justifi-
cation for legislation challenged by the Commerce Clause,79 the reason
for the rejection centered on the means employed by the state schemes,
rather than the illegitimacy of the state goal protecting the local work
force.80 In Baldwin v. Seelig,81 the Court refused to countenance the
argument made by New York that regulations to prevent the destruc-
tion of industry by outside competition were a health measure.82 Al-
though recognizing that there is no health if workers are starving, the
Court thought that using this excuse to prevent competition would lead
to reprisals by other states culminating in protective tariffs, the stiffling
of trade, and the "speedy end of our national solidarity."8 3 By its terms
and in effect, the E.S.A. does not inhibit the businesses of other states
from competing in California. As will be shown in the following sec-
tion, the E.S.A. poses little threat to national solidarity by inducing
competition among the state legislatures seeking to tie down local busi-
nesses, and is a suitable subject for state legislation.
B. States Are Appropriate Bodies to Form this Type of Legislation
As a preliminary matter, the Commerce Clause, by its own weight,
will not preempt this type of act because the Clause rarely preempts
any field, and then only when the lack of uniformity would hinder the
flow of interstate goods.84 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the
state is not the appropriate body to create an act regulating business in
this way because only national legislation can accommodate the differ-
ent interests involved.85 The point is well taken that responses to these
business restrictions will vary among the states due to the differences in
local conditions. Since large markets like California attract business, 86
77. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1452(c).
78. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at 5, cols. 1-2.
79. See, e.g., City of Philadeohia, 437 U.S. at 627.
80. See, e g., id at 626-27.
81. 294 U.s. 511 (1935).
82. Id at 523.
83. Id
84. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978).
85. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 254.
86. See Range, Playboy Interview Akio MArita, P.AY'oy, Aug., 1982, 69, 78.
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the imposition of measures increasing the difficulty of extracting busi-
nesses from the market area is not likely to completely discourage busi-
ness from coming to California. States with less attractive markets,
however, face the prospect of alienating businesses that do not have to
be there by passing legislation like the E.S.A. Therefore, the need to
adapt regulations of this sort to conditions peculiar to the states indi-
cates that they can best judge the extent of control over business neces-
sary to improve local conditions.
Because the E.S.A. does not discriminate against out-of-state compe-
tition on its face or in effect, 87 other states will not be inclined to retali-
ate with more restrictive legislation, thus causing economic
stagnation.88 In fact, since opponents perceive the E.S.A. as discourag-
ing businesses from locating in California,89 neighboring states may re-
frain from following suit in order to capture timid management shying
away from the restrictions. Even if every state has this kind of statute,
business might not stagnate90 because the uniformity of the burden of
responsibility toward workers would place no group of companies at a
disadvantage. A detailed examination of the economic impact upon
the nation of one or more states adopting the E.S.A. is beyond the
scope of this comment, but from the foregoing discussion there does not
appear to be a grave threat to national solidarity9' no matter how many
states eventually regulate business mobility. Since the E.S.A. would
not be preempted, 92 is appropriate for state legislation,93 and is not of a
protectionist character,94 the next section will discuss the remaining is-
sues of whether the putative benefits of the E.S.A. outweigh its burden
on interstate commerce, and whether a less restrictive alternative might
accomplish the same objective.
C The Commerce Clause Balancing Test 4pplied to the Employment
Stabilization Act
State regulations that act evenhandedly to alleviate legitimate local
problems, and cause only an incidental effect on interstate commerce,
87. The E.S.A. does not concern the flow of goods, but only burdens the movement of large
businesses located in California; thus, it raises the business costs for California enterprises. This
may potentially benefit competitors from other states who do not have this expense. While the
E.S.A. inhibits the ability of other states or countries to lure businesses away from California,
businesses have no better prospect for significant in state movement. See supra notes 67-78 and
accompanying text.
88. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 234.
89. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at 5, cols. 1-2.
90. But see Arnold, supra note 2, at 234.
91. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
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will be upheld "unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative social benefits."95 A recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co. ,96 indicated an increasing willingness on the part of the Court to
uphold burdensome statutes that pass the "crucial inquiry" into
whether they are protectionist measures.97 In Clover Leaf, the Court
upheld a statute that banned the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturn-
able, nonrefillable containers, but that allowed the sale of milk in pa-
perboard nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers.98 The Minnesota
Legislature intended to promote the use of recyclable packaging, to re-
duce energy waste and solid waste management problems, and to slow
down the depletion of natural resources.99 The Minnesota District
Court had held that the statute violated the Commerce Clause; how-
ever, the state Supreme Court found no rational relation between the
statute and its avowed purpose, and struck it down on Equal Protection
grounds. 00 The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
After disposing of the Equal Protection argument by finding a ra-
tional relationship between the statute and its goal, the Court consid-
ered the Commerce Clause argument used by the Minnesota District
Court, focusing on the relation of the burden on interstate commerce to
the local benefits.' 0' The fact that the Minnesota statute applied to all
milk producers, without exceptions for local dairies, satisfied the in-
quiry into discrimination.0 2 The Court found that commerce was not
seriously burdened by the statute because milk products would con-
tinue to move across the Minnesota border and because the inconven-
ience was slight since most dairies issued their products in more than
one kind of container. 10 3 The legitimate ecological benefit to the state,
however, was also slight as shown by the decisions of the state courts
based on the sharply contrasting evidence that disputed even a rational
relationship between the mechanics of the legislation and its
purpose.1°4
The relatively equal lack of burden and benefit discussed above did
not, of course, satisfy the requirement that the burden be "clearly ex-
95. Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 441.
96. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
97. Id at 475 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. Id at 467.
99. Id at 458.
100. Id at 470.
101. Id at 472.
102. Id at 471-72.
103. Id at 472.
104. Id at 464. An~impermissible substitution of the court's judgment for that of the Legisla-
ture caused the reversal, not an erroneous finding of fact. Id at 469.
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cessive in relation to the putative local benefits;"' 5 however, the Court
also permitted favoritism toward the Minnesota pulp wood industry at
the expense of the out-of-state plastics producers. 0 6 The legislation ac-
complished little for the stated purpose of environmental protection
since environmentally undesirable paperboard containers were not dis-
couraged at all.'0 7 Although the Minnesota law only slightly affected
the dairy industry, the law clearly favored a major Minnesota industry,
the manufacture of pulp wood, over the entirely out-of-state plastics
industry.10 Nevertheless, the Court re-emphasized that the burden
must be "clearly excessive," and "in the light of the substantial state
interest. . ." the Court upheld this burden despite the preference for a
local concern.10 9 In Clover Leaf, the deference to legislative purpose
equaled that used in the Equal Protection rational relation analysis," 0
and the Court refrained from vigorously analyzing the Legislative
means as well as ends."'
The unusual deference for legislative purpose in Clover Lea/has not
been narrowed or expanded by subsequent Supreme Court cases," 2
and the reasons for upholding the E.S.A. compel at least the same re-
spect as those offered on behalf of the Minnesota statute." 3 Further-
more, the means chosen to enforce the social responsibility of the
employment relationship are more likely to achieve that end. To for-
bid the use of one environmentally undesirable product while allowing
another to flourish may achieve some measure of environmental pro-
tection, 4 but the E.S.A.'s re-routing of money to the employees and
twelve month notice requirement will produce a direct effect on busi-
ness dislocations because such restrictions will make closing the last
option of management." 5 In addition, no favoritism for local industry
lurks on the fringes of the E.S.A., 1 6 so those bearing the burden of
complying with the E.S.A. can lobby against it and vote their displea-
sure. This political check should invite less judicial scrutiny since the
105. Id at 472.
106. Id at 473.
107. Id at 466.
108. Id at 473.
109. Id
110. Id
111. But see, City of Philadephia, 437 U.S. at 626.
112. See Reznick, The Constitutionality ofBusiness Regulation in the Burger Court: Revival and
Restraint, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 82 (1981).
113. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
114. See Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 469.
115. While a mere rational relation between the Minnesota statute's ends and means was at
issue in Clover Leaf, a criticism of legislation like the E.S.A. is that it will tie down businesses in
California. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 234. Thus, the former statute was criticized for being
ineffective, and the latter for being too effective.
116. Local businesses are the loudest critics of the E.S.A., see Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1982, at
5, cols. 1-2.
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regulated businesses can take political action instead of having to rely
solely on the court for relief.' The combination of a lesser need for
judicial scrutiny" 8 and a more effective means of achieving important
legislative goals' 19 should outweigh the correspondingly increased bur-
dens inherent in the E.S.A.120 Although the scales should be tipped in
favor of the E.S.A. in the current Commerce Clause balancing test,
there remains the question of whether there is a less burdensome
alternative.
As an alternative to similar legislation proposed in Ohio,12' one
writer suggested that an additional payroll tax be levied on employers
and put into a fund for reparations in the event of a dislocation because
the taxing scheme would interfere less with the freedom of a business to
move. 122 This tax could provide monetary relief for those employees
who are displaced in years hence; however, the tax would do nothing
for the workers displaced now. The E.S.A. attempts to remedy a cur-
rent unemployment problem in California; 123 furthermore, there is
nothing to stop companies from beginning similar in-house tax pro-
grams voluntarily in order to accumulate funds for compliance with the
E.S.A.
More importantly, the E.S.A. purports to foster responsibility by the
employer for the worker and, as a necessary byproduct, to discourage
relocation and make it the last option.2 4 Providing workers with sev-
erance pay alleviates the employees' problems temporarily, but, as the
author of the suggestion admits, this remedy treats only the symptom
and ignores the disease. 25 The E.S.A. promotes planning to prevent
unemployment "because this planning is fundamental to the social re-
sponsibility of the employment relationship."'' 26 Severance pay is im-
portant to the worker, but so are notice, the chance for re-employment,
and information about alternatives for the unemployed. A less burden-
some plan should accomplish the same goals of the plan under attack
before the court strikes the latter down.'27 Since the reduction of mo-
bility is inherently incidental to the social responsibility fostered by the
117. See Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 447; Reznick, supra note 112, at 80.
118. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 33-62, 115 and accompanying text.
121. S.B. No. 118, 113th Ohio Gen. Ass. (1979-80); discussed in Arnold supra, note 2, at 232-
34.
122. Arnold supra, note 2, at 252.
123. See Sacramento Bee, Aug. 7, 1982, at 1, cols. 5-6.
124. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1451(c); cf. Arnold, supra note 2, at 234.
125. "Employers would, however, be free to make a decision to move their entire business or
portions thereof in interstate commerce. . .;" Arnold, supra note 2, at 252.
126. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1451(c).
127. See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 473-74.
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E.S.A., any solution that ignores this incidental burden does not pro-
mote the same social responsibility here being demanded of business,
and should not prevail over the E.S.A.
The traditional Commerce Clause arguments against the E.S.A.
presented above do not withstand careful examination. Nonetheless, as
a final argument against the Commerce Clause challenge, this com-
ment will discuss a new theory that would greatly reduce the scope of
the Clause. At least one eminent scholar, Professor Eule, questions the
initial assumption that comparing the relative values of different pro-
posals, or comparing local benefits against interstate burdens, is a
proper function of the court.'2 In brief, his article, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause To Rest,'29 demonstrates the impropriety of a Com-
merce Clause challenge to the E.S.A. because its invalidation could re-
sult only from the judicial usurpation of the democratic process. 130 The
framers of the Constitution intended the Commerce Clause to combat
protectionism among the states, but its use to protect free trade was a
judicial invention.' 3  The greater the burden on commerce, the more
likely the court is to invalidate the statute; but, "[t]here is something
fundamentally wrong with a judicial framework that prompts judicial
intervention by the same trigger that induces political response."'132
Professor Eule demonstrates that the Commerce Clause requires inter-
vention by the court only when the democratic process is threatened by
a "disproportionate" effect on outsiders. 3 3 A shift in the law in the
direction mapped out by Professor Eule should encourage future pro-
ponents of the E.S.A.; 34 nevertheless, as the law stands today, the
E.S.A. can clear the Commerce Clause hurdle. The argument now will
turn to a constitutional obstacle recently reconstructed by the Burger
Court, the Contract Clause.
35
128. See Eule, supra note 67, at 443.
129. 91 YALE L. J. 425 (1982).
130. Id at 443.
131. Id at 428.
132. Id at 436.
133. Id at 443, 460.
134. The E.S.A. effects predominantly California businesses, see supra notes 71-75 and accom-
panying text, so there would be no "disproportionate" effect on outsiders; therefore, intervention
under the Commerce Clause would be unwarranted. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying
text.
135. "No State shall... pass any.. . law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S.
CONST. art. I, §10. The Contract Clause was reconstructed in Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234, 241-44, 250-51 (1978).
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THE NEW OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON BUSINESS BY THE
EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION ACT ARE SUBJECT TO THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE
The same E.S.A. provisions that attract Commerce Clause scrutiny,
that is notice and hiring preference or severance pay, also raise suspi-
cion under the Contract Clause as recently interpreted by the Supreme
Court.136 In the seminal case, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus,137 the
majority of the Supreme Court invalidated the Minnesota Private Pen-
sion Benefits Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the Pension Act)
which significantly increased the existing pension plan duties of em-
ployers.' 38 As discussed previously, the E.S.A. saddles employers with
many new responsibilities which exceed their current contractual obli-
gations.' 39 While the Contract Clause speaks of "impairing" obliga-
tions, thereby implying the dilution or nullification of previous duties,
the plain meaning of impairment is not reliable after Allied.140 As a
result, any positive social legislation that affects contractual obligations
will be subject to judicial evaluation since the shifting of responsibili-
ties among parties under contract necessarily places additional burdens
on one of them. 141 This broad approach significantly increases the risk
of judicial abuse of discretion under Contract Clause inquiry. 42
Under the Allied analysis, the more serious the legislative attempt to
alter the status quo for the benefit of the less privileged, the closer the
court will look to invalidate the scheme since "the severity of the im-
pairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislature must
clear."' 43 The Contract Clause, therefore, will be a major part of the
business community's defense when California businesses try to reject
the burden transplanted from the workers in business dislocations. Al-
though the E.S.A. interferes at least as much with employment con-
tracts as did the stricken Pension Act in Allied,'" significant
distinctions between them will be shown which should permit the
E.S.A. to avoid the Contract Clause obstacle despite the enlarged
boundaries of that clause.
136. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
137. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
138. See id at 238, 250-51.
139. See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
140. 438 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting).
141. See id at 252.
142. Reznick, supra note 112, at 31.
143. 438 U.S. at 245.
144. Compare the provisions of the E.S.A. set out insupra notes 33-62 and accompanying text,
with the terms of the Pension Act inllied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 236-40.
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A. The Scope of the Economic Conditions Confronted by the
Employment Stabilization Aet
One of the major flaws of the Pension Act perceived by the Allied
majority was that the disruption of contractual expectations was not
"necessary to meet an important general social problem."' 45 The Min-
nesota Legislature knew that the Pension Act would soon be
superceded by federal legislation 4 6 and placed little evidence of legis-
lative intent in the record; so, the "presumption favoring 'legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular meas-
ure"' could not be upheld. 147 Although the Allied majority did not
state the specific social evil addressed by the Pension Act, Justice Bren-
nan's dissent indicated that it was an interim measure to avoid the frus-
tration of employee expectations caused by plant closures before the
workers' rights in their pension plan had become vested. 148 The major-
ity did not believe the Pension Act confronted a situation "remotely
approaching the broad and disparate emergency economic conditions
of the early 1930's-conditions of which the Court in Blaisdell took
judicial notice."141
The analogy to the depression era need for social legislation is more
apt now than it was in 1978.when Allied was decided because the cur-
rent national unemployment rate is higher than it has been in the last
forty years.150 The economic situation may not be as desparate today
in California as it was in Arkansas in the Blaisdell era, but the Contract
Clause does not require an "emergency of great magnitude to justify
state law."'' The widespread unemployment, which prompted the
drafting of the E.S.A.,152 should permit a greater impairment of con-
tract5 3 than did the less severe problem confronting the Minnesota
Legislature.' 5 4 A related factor that influenced the Court to invalidate
the Pension Act was its limited coverage.1
5 5
145. 438 U.S. at 247.
146. Id at 247 n.21.
147. Id at 247.
148. Id at 252. The Pension Act also dealt with the termination of entire pension plans. Id
at 252 n.l.
149. Id at 249. The Court's reference is to Home Building and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934).
150. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 7, 1982, at 1, cols. 5-6.
151. 438 U.S. at 249 n.24.
152. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1451(a). Compare id with Sacramento Bee, Aug. 7, 1982, at
1, cols. 5-6; and id Aug. 5, 1982, at 5, cols. 1-2.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. See 438 U.S. at 247.
155. See infra notes 156-171 and accompanying text.
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B. The Coverage of the Employment Stabilization Act
The Court looks to the scope of an act to see if the regulations could
be an adequate response to the social problem. 156 The law must be
"enacted to protect a broad societal interest rather than a narrow
class.'" 57 The Pension Act applied to private employers who employed
100 workers or more and had established a voluntary pension plan that
qualified under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, but only if
the employer closed a Minnesota office or terminated the pension
plan.'5 8 This narrow aim, combined with the severe, retroactive, and
permanent alteration15 9 of a vital term of the contract, 60 distinguished
the Minnesota Act from those that had previously been upheld under
the Contract.Clause.' 6 1
The E.S.A., however, protects a much broader class of persons than
did the Pension Act. Although the E.S.A.'s threshold requirement of
300 or more employees, or 50 or more at a single work place in Califor-
nia if the company employs more than 2,000 nationwide, 162 is higher,
the E.S.A. applies to all employees of qualified private businesses16
3
who have worked 13 out of the previous 52 weeks'" rather than those
who have worked for ten or more years.' 65 In contrast with the Pension
Act, which protected workers only where voluntary pension plans had
been established, 66 the E.S.A. regulates businesses that have not cov-
ered business dislocation in a collective bargaining agreement.' 67 The
exclusion of businesses that agree on terms of closure in collective bar-
gaining ensures that virtually all large private employers in California
will look after the interests of their dismissed employees more care-
fully. The E.S.A. controls non-union businesses and could influence
bargaining strategy of unionized businesses since the absence of a col-
lective bargaining agreement on plant closures will result in the appli-
cation of the E.S.A.168  Furthermore, the E.S.A. is triggered by a
reduction of 25 percent of the work force or 15 employees, whichever is
more, 69 not by the closure of an entire work place or discarding of the
156. 438 U.S. at 249.
157. Id
158. Id at 248.
159. Id at 250.
160. Id at 246.
161. Id at 250.
162. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1452(c).
163. Id §1453(b).
164. Id §1452(a).
165. 438 U.S. at 246.
166. Id at 248.
167. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1452(c).
168. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
169. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1451(f).
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pension plan. 70
Thus, due to the nature of the problems in California and the
breadth of the Legislature's response, two of the major criticisms of the
Pension Act cannot be leveled at the E.S.A.; 17 1 however, the E.S.A. is a
target for others. As will be demonstrated, these additional criticisms
should not be sufficient in themselves to strike the E.S.A. under the
Contract Clause.
C. Defects in the Employment Stabilization Act Under the Contract
Clause
A flaw common to both the Pension Act and the E.S.A. is that they
are not limited to the duration of the crisis.' 72 The Allied majority re-
lies on Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell173 where a
mortgage moratorium was enacted to provide relief for homeowners
threatened with foreclosure, but the relief was limited to the duration of
the emergency. 74 As the Allied dissent points out, Blaisdell involved
the suspension by state of the homeowner's obligation rather than the
addition of a new one.175 Since suspension of obligations posed the
harm that the framers intended to quash with the Contract Clause,176
the need for suspended obligations to be temporary is more pro-
nounced. Legislation effecting social change will rarely be limited to a
certain time frame 77 because a reversion to the previous state of affairs
would be counter-productive. The Blaisdell legislation merely pro-
vided temporary relief so that people did not go homeless; it is com-
pletely dissimilar to legislation that attacks the reasons why people go
homeless. 78 The latter acts as preventative medicine that necessarily
must be continuous, but the former merely attempts to cure an existing
wound and becomes superfluous after the sore heals. The majority in
Allied did not think that the Pension Act was as preventative as it was
punitive, 179 hence the lack of a termination date rendered the legisla-
tion inappropriate for its narrow purpose.'8 0 Therefore, it is not clear
preventative legislation like the E.S.A. must be temporary despite the
use of that criterion by the majority in Allied.
170. 438 U.S. at 248.
171. See supra notes 145-170 and accompanying text.
172. 438 U.S. at 250.
173. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
174. 438 U.S. at 242.
175. Id at 256.
176. Id
177. Id at 261.
178. Id at 242.
179. Id at 248, 250.
180. See id at 250.
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Another charge that can be levelled against both Acts is that the Leg-
islature has entered a field never before regulated.' TheAllied dissent
recognized that the court can easily manipulate this factor because the
field can be viewed broadly or narrowly. 1 2 The California Legislature
has been concerned with increased employer responsibility to the
worker for some time, and has enacted worker's compensation8 3 and
other laws to increase employer responsiveness; 8 4 however, it has
never previously restricted business movement as would the E.S.A.'8 5
Assuming that this field is considered completely new in California,
legislating in virgin territory cannot by itself cause a Contract Clause
violation or the Legislature would be handcuffed. Entering a new
field, 8 6 retroactive effect,' 87 and permanence' s enlarge the impair-
ment that must be justified because they increase the disruption of con-
tract-based expectations. 8 9 Broad social reform under the state's
police power is "paramount to any rights under contract between indi-
viduals;"' 190 nevertheless, where the statute causes a severe impairment
by the aforementioned means, the Legislature loses the presumption of
"necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."' 91 Although
the Pension Act did not withstand the strenuous judicial examination
of legislative purpose and the means chosen to achieve it, the Califor-
nia Legislature can better demonstrate important social reasons to jus-
tify a severe impairment caused by legislation like the E.S.A.' 92
Moreover, the issue of retroactive effect is not as strong here as in
Allied because the E.S.A. does not provide for those already unem-
ployed, but will act prospectively after enactment. 93 Of course, the
dissent in Allied did not believe the Minnesota statute acted retrospec-
tively either, 194 and the real concern of the majority appears to be the
lack of a grace period or gradual applicability. 95 A grace period
181. Id at 249.
182. Id at 261 n.8.
183. CAL. LaB. CODE §§3200-6002.
184. See generally id §§1771-1798; id §§1410-1433. These sections regulate work conditions,
wages, and hours for women and minors, and fair employment practices.
185. See Assembly Labor & Employment Committee Report, bill no. 2839, hearing date Apr.
13, 1982, at 1.
186. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
189. See 41lied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247, 249, 250.
190. Id at 241.
191. Id at 247.
192. See supra notes 145-171 and accompanying text.
193. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1452(c), (1). Although §1452(c) refers to the preceeding 12
months to determine the size of the company, section 1452(0 does not act retrospectively to deter-
mine a reduction in operations to trigger the E.S.A.
194. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 255.
195. Id at 247.
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would not be appropriate for legislation enacted to relieve an immedi-
ate problem. As mentioned before, the E.S.A. attempts to prevent fu-
ture disproportionate hardships to workers, 19 6 but it also responds to
the immediate crisis which prompted its drafting; 197 therefore, the type
of solution justifies its permanence and the type of problem justifies its
immediacy. InAllied, neither the problem nor the solution were signif-
icant enough, according to the majority, to allow Minnesota to do con-
stitutionally "what it tried to do to the company .. ."198 Although
legislation like the E.S.A. should stand up to the discretionary ap-
proach of the majority, 99 such legislation fares even better under the
standards set out in the dissent.
D. The Interpretation of the Contract Clause by the Dissent
It should be noted at the outset that Allied was a five to three deci-
sion; however, the current Court stands four to three on the issue be-
cause Justice Blackman took no part in Allied,200 and Justice Stewart,
who penned the majority opinion, has been replaced by Justice
O'Connor. The wording of the majority opinion, moreover, leaves
open the option of limiting Allied to its facts without greatly chagrining
the Court because the majority held, "that if the Contract Clause
means anything at all, it means that Minnesota could not constitution-
ally do what it tried to do to the company in this case." 20' These
points, plus the geners1ly unfavorable response by legal scholars to the
decision, 02 indicate that the minority positiofi may prevail the next
time a Contract Clause case reaches the Supreme Court.
Should the dissent prevail, the Contract Clause would have no appli-
cation to the E.S.A. because of the distinction between the addition of
new obligations and the nullification of existing terms of a contract.2 "3
The E.S.A. does the former, but only the latter constitutes an impair-
ment of contract;2 4 therefore, constitutional analysis would focus on
196. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
197. There are 1.3 million people out of work in California, which is 10% of the work force.
Sacramento Bee, Aug. 7, 1982, at 1, cols. 5-6. This figure is above the national unemployment
rate, and the national .unemployment rate is higher than it has been in the last 40 years. Id The
E.S.A. is strongly backed by unions whose constituents are losing jobs due to plant closures. Id
Aug. 5, p. 5, cols. 1-2.
198. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 251.
199. See Id at 250-51.
200. Id at 251.
201. Id at 250-51.
202. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979 Supp., 45-50); Reznick supra note
112, at 31; e.g. Comment, The Contract Clause" A ConstitutionalBasisfor Invalidating Stale LegIs-
lation, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 927, 955-57 (1979).
203. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 255-56.
204. Id at 256.
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. °5 Moreover,
the Allied dissent contains unequivocal support for one of the more
burdensome requirements of the E.S.A., saying,
The existence of the Act's duties-which are similar to a legislatively
imposed requirement of severance pay measured by the length of the
discharged employees' service-is simply one of a number of factors
that the employer considers in making the business decision to termi-
nate the employees who work there.2
Justice Brennan argues that the Contract Clause never protected con-
tract-based expectations and that the vague majority approach vests
"judges with broad subjective discretion to protect property interests
that happen to appeal to them."20 7 The inapplicability of the Contract
Clause to the national government demonstrates that contractual ex-
pectations were never sacrosanct under the Constitution.208 Instead of
promoting consistency by protecting any interference with expectation
interests, the Court will reach anomalous results based on whether the
"impairment" eminates from state or national sources and whether the
expectation was protected by contract.20 9 There is little reason to treat
property differently due to its derivation without regard to its
substance.210
Although this comment does not pretend to be able to predict which
side will prevail, the tendency of the Burger Court toward moderation
when evaluating economic legislation211 indicates that the majority po-
sition will not be used as broadly as the dissent fears. Under the ap-
proach of either the dissent or the majority, however, the E.S.A. should
survive the Contract Clause objection.21 2 Thus, the last significant con-
stitutional attack on the E.S.A. to be repelled is the assertion that the
severity of the regulations might be a "taking without
compensation." 213
THE SECTIONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION ACT WHICH
ARE IMPLICATED BY THE TAKING CLAUSE
The E.S.A. requires twelve months notice before a planned reduction
205. Although beyond the scope of this comment, there is little reason to suspect that the
Employment Stabilization Act will fail the looser rational relation test of Due Process for social
and economic legislation. Id at 263.
206. Id at 254-55.
207. Id at 261.
208. Id at 259.
209. Id at 259, 262.
210. Comment, supra note 202, at 956-57.
211. Reznick, supra note 112, at 10.
212. See supra notes 136-211 and accompanying text.
213. "IN]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. imend. V.
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of operations.214 In situations where a company determines that it
must shut down within a year or it will suffer losses, the company will
be compelled to operate at a loss during the lag between the shut down
date and the running of the notice. It is suggested that this restriction
on the use of the property may result in a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation as prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.215 This section will demonstrate that the twelve month notice re-
quirement does not involve a taking under the current Supreme Court
analysis. Further, an alternative approach will be suggested that
should balance the needs of the employers and the workers more
evenly and avoid the question of a taking altogether. This analysis will
begin by ascertaining who should bear the cost imposed by the
regulations.
A. Who Should Bear the Burden of this Reform?
It cannot be disputed that the notice requirement destroys some
property rights since those rights address a citizen's interest in the pos-
session, use, and disposal of his property 216 and since the ability to dis-
pose of the property is limited for up to a year. Therefore, the real
controversy concerns whether this destruction of a property right is a
taking, a much more difficult problem to solve due to the dearth of
settled principles.217 The United States Supreme Court freely admits to
providing little assistance, saying, "[t]here is no abstract or fixed point
at which judicial intervention under the Taking Clause becomes appro-
priate ... [r]esolution of each case,. . . ultimately calls as much for
the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic. ' 218 Certain
factors, nevertheless, clearly influence the Court when it considers the
extent of the restrictions on property which will be tolerated without
requiring compensation.
One factor the Supreme Court considers is the character of the gov-
ernmental intrusion.2 19  A physical invasion generally interferes more
than the rules of a "public problem adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good." 220 Yet, an emergency
sacrifice of private property for the preservation of property more valu-
214. A.B. 2839, supra note 1, §1460(b).
215. Arnold, supra note 2, at 247.
216. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
217. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979).
218. Id
219. Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 124.
220. Id
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able to the public is not a taking22' because the owner has no right to
property that endangers the general welfare.222 As a practical matter,
government cannot function if it must compensate property owners
every time their holdings are devalued because of changes in the law.2 23
Regulations are less likely to destroy the present use of the property
than physical invasion; however, this turns on the extent of the interfer-
ence with the property as a whole.224
Evaluating the extent of the interference is the second and more diffi-
cult component of the taking issue. While diminution in value alone
cannot establish a taking,225 the interference cannot be so severe as to
constitute an act of eminent domain requiring compensation to sustain
it.226 To challenge successfully the statute the plaintiffs must show that
it almost completely destroys the value of the property.227 Even though
the venture may be forced to continue at a loss, the notice requirement
of the E.S.A. may not completely destroy the value of a business be-
cause the compulsion can last no longer than twelve months. In Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,228 the regulations were found to be a
taking because they prohibited, in practical effect, a reasonable return
on the owners' investment-based expectations; 229 the E.S.A., however,
merely delays rather than prohibits the return on an investment.230
Furthermore, creativity by management can reduce the impact of the
short term loss by putting the employees to work in different ways. For
example, rather than continuing production when there is no need,
managers could reassign workers to maintenance projects to improve
the plant for the time when production needs rise again, or to increase
the value should the owner wish to sell.23'
The denial of the owner's prerogative to shut down a plant or of any
other traditional property right, does not necessarily amount to a tak-
ing. Where the owner "possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. 232 In Andrus v. Allard,233 the
owners were prohibited from selling bald eagle feathers that were ob-
221. Id at 126.
222. See TRiBE, supra note 202, at 463-64.
223. Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 124.
224. Id at 130-3 1.
225. Id at 131.
226. Id at 136.
227. See Rezick, supra note 112, at 24.
228. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
229. Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 127 (analyzingPennsylyania Coal, 260 U.S. 393).
230. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1460(b).
231. See Range, supra note 86, at 80.
232. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 66 (1979).
233. 444 U.S. at 51.
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tained before the ban on trafficking in rare bird parts was imposed,234
but the court deemed it crucial that the appellees retained their rights to
possess, transport, donate, or devise their property.2 35 The E.S.A. bars
no right, but limits the right to transport or close a facility while leaving
possession, sale, donation, or devise of the property within the owner's
discretion.236 Certainly, the inability to sell property reduces its value
as much as the inability to dispose of it immediately, and must frustrate
the investment-backed expectation of a reasonable return even more
because there is no time limitation onthe restriction. The Court in
Andrus says that, "the loss of future profits-unaccompanied by any
physical property restriction-provides a slender reed upon which to
rest a taking's claim. '2 37 Although the Court suggests that the ban on
the sale does not make the property entirely useless commercially be-
cause the owners may be able to display the feathers and charge for
admission,238 a more plausible explanation for the decision lies in the
fundamental question of who should bear the losses caused by the de-
sired changes.239
There seem to be two criteria that are weighed according to the facts
of each case to determine who should bear the cost, though the Court
has not explicitly addressed either of them. The first seeks to determine
who is responsible for prompting the legislation, or if no one, who ben-
efits most from the legislation.24 The second focuses on who is the best
cost spreader.24' The second criterion was by implication a factor in
Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. New York,242 and carried more
weight than the first because no one was at fault for the expense inher-
234. Id at 54.
235. Id at 66.
236. Of course, the E.S.A. could hamper attempts to sell due to the 12 month notice require-
ment and the severance fee etc. See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
237. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66.
238. Id
239. Pennsylyania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
240. The first criteria is a combination of rationales posited by Professor Tribe for two types of
taking cases: where the government acts to redistribute wealth, and where property is taken be-
cause its former use was immoral or otherwise unacceptable. The rationale for the former taking
is that the owners had more than their rightful share in the first place. The latter is explained by
the fact that the owner had no right to continue using the property in such a manner. TRIBE, supra
note 202, at 463-464. Where no one is responsible for conditions causing the regulations, such as
where historical buildings are protected by zoning, the Court looks to see if those in the commu-
nity benefit more than the property holder who must conform. See Penn. Central Transportation,
at 132-33. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
241. The second criteria is from the rationale suggested by Professor Tribe for a third type of
taking case: government reallocating property to generate more of some desired benefit, or less of
a disliked detriment. The rationale is procedural rather than substantive and rests on the proposi-
tion that it would cost more to administer a system of compensation for those burdened than the
compensation would be worth in the long run. TRIBE, supra note 202, at 463-64; see Penn. Central,
at 152.
242. 438 U.S. 104, 148, 151 (1978) (Rebnquist, J., dissenting).
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ent in preserving historical landmarks.243 The benefit inured to all of
the citizens of New York evenly. Despite some property owners being
burdened more than other property owners, the mutual benefit received
through the enhancement of the entire community justifies the individ-
ual cost in such land use restriction cases.
244
The first factor weighed much more heavily in Andrus than in Penn.
Central because those who sell feathers undoubtedly contribute more
heavily than the general public to the demise of the protected birds
which previously wore them. Even though the plaintiffs had obtained
the feathers prior to the passage of the legislation banning the sale of
feathers, their sale would encourage others to try to circumvent the
law.245 The Court dismissed the argument that the sellers should not
have to bear the cost of those regulations saying, "within limits, that is
a burden borne to secure the advantage of living and doing business in
a civilized community."2 46 In situations where the owner creates the
wrong, the law redresses the previous imbalance through regulations
burdening those responsible instead of the general public.
247
The same rationale explains the Pennsylvania Coal result as well.
The public bought only surface rights, leaving the underground min-
eral rights to the mining operation.248 Soon afterward, the state legisla-
ture passed a law prohibiting mining within 150 feet of a residence,
thus destroying the value of the underground mineral rights.249 The
majority of the Court believed that the public created the risk to the
housing by choosing to buy only the surface rights; therefore, the public
should pay the price of acquiring greater security.25 °
Both criteria support the attempt by the California Legislature to
place the burden of providing notice on the employers. To begin with,
legislative judgment carries with it a rebuttable presumption of consti-
tutionality under the Taking Clause.251 The E.S.A. is based on the leg-
islative judgment that the responsibilities of the employer in an
employment relationship extend beyond the work place.2 2 The re-
sponsibilities include acting to minimize or avoid the hardships to the
worker and the community caused by layoffs.2 53 The reason for plac-
243. Id at 134-35.
244. Id at 132-33.
245. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 58-9.
246. Id at 67.
247. TitBE, supra note 202, at 463-64.
248. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
249. Id at 412-13.
250. See id at 416.
251. See id at 413; Reznick, supra note 112, at 19.
252. See A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1451(d).
253. Id
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ing the responsibility on private enterprise is that the closing of large
plants exacts a social price that goes uncharged to those who make the
decision. 4 In other words, since companies create the risk of displac-
ing large numbers of workers, it is only fair that they should bear part
of the cost caused by law enacted to alleviate that risk. Therefore, the
E.S.A. does not contravene the basic prohibition of the Taking Clause,
that is, that the interests of the few cannot arbitrarily be sacrificed for
the many.25 In addition, the cost may be spread more efficiently by
companies treating the potential delay in moving as another business
expense to calculate before deciding to close, than by adding a greater
burden to the taxpayers for less efficient government spending.
Although the restriction on property caused by the E.S.A. should not
be deemed excessive, and businesses are properly saddled with the bur-
den, the current case by case approach leaves controversies in doubt
until the decision is rendered. 56 A more certain way for the Legisla-
ture to avoid the problem would be to modify the notice requirement.
B. A Proposed Modffcation of the Notice Requirement
The E.S.A. already includes a limited escape clause which allows
companies to provide notice after the fact when the closure of a busi-
ness is a surprise.25 7 The disparity of treatment between those who
qualify1 8 for this narrow exception and the unequivocal twelve month
notice requirement for everyone else effectively protects workers' inter-
ests, but may not adequately account for management's need for flex-
ibility.2 9 The cost of moving or closing under the E.S.A. will do much
to preserve workers' jobs even without the twelve month guarantee be-
cause businesses will not close until it is clearly more economically
painful to remain open.260 Furthermore, the choice of new work or
severance pay26 1 will buy time for workers to search for new
employment.
Therefore, the goal of the notice requirement should be to avoid de-
ceptive practices by management at the workers' expense rather than
simply to provide a lengthy blanket notice period. Whatever the pro-
spective business advantages of closing without notice are, they must be
254. Arnold, supra note 2, at 233-34.
255. TRIBE, supra note 202, at 463-64.
256. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
257. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1460(c).
258. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
259. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 232-34.
260. Id at 234.
261. Accepting the work would obviate the need to look for new employment, and the sever-
ance pay would help support the unemployed while between jobs. See supra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
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tempered by fair play in regard to employees and the community. To
require companies to send notice when the decision is made, rather
than demanding clairvoyance by management, sufficiently vindicates
the principle of fairness.
The legislative choice of twelve months notice can be justified as a
way to avoid the manipulation by businesses of a flexible standard like
the one proposed above. The United States Supreme Court upheld a
similar argument for blanket coverage under an act in Andrus.2 62 Nev-
ertheless, the problem of enforcing the flexible standard is not appreci-
ably more difficult than enforcing the current exception because in the
latter, the D.I.R. must detect businesses that claim to be surprised in
order to escape from the advance notice requirement.26 The E.S.A.
compels businesses to submit their financial and operating records for
the investigative and planning activity conducted by the D.I.R., pursu-
ant to its duty to find alternatives to closing or ways to cushion its im-
pact,2" but the records can also be used to check the appropriateness of
very short notice given by companies claiming recent economic devel-
opments. Unless the enforcement problems are practically insur-
mountable, requiring notice concurrent with the decision to reduce
operations is preferable to the twelve month notice because the former
avoids the taking issue altogether,265 and reaches a more equitable ac-
commodation of competing interests. To guarantee workers some time
to brace for unemployment without slowing business decisions drasti-
cally, a minimum of three months notice before closure may be a desir-
able addition to notice concurrent with the decision to reduce
operations. Regardless of which approach to the notice requirement is
adopted by subsequent proponents of the E.S.A., those supporters
should not be intimidated by speculation about the unconstitutionality
under the Taking Clause of making businesses attend to their social
responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Although certainly a close question, the E.S.A. should not succumb
to challenges under the Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, or Taking
Clause. The E.S.A. does not fall under the Commerce Clause first be-
262. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 58-9.
263. A.B.2839, supra note 1, §1470.
264. Id §1463.
265. The taking issue would be avoided because businesses would not have to wait for a notice
period to run unless they neglected to provide notice when the determination to shutdown was
made. Therefore, they would not be compelled to operate at a loss for more than three months (or
whatever minimum time is set). This shorter period would not be significant enough to be a
taking. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 251.
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cause the restrictions on businesses are not discriminatory. 66 Califor-
nia enterprises bear the burden of the statute, and competitors are not
discouraged.267 Furthermore, the burden should not be deemed
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits" because of
the magnitude of the problems the E.S.A. confronts.268 Alternative
means of coping with the problem of business dislocations that merely
raise money in a less obtrusive manner are not viable because they ig-
nore a major component of the E.S.A., that is, the intent to make clo-
sure the last choice of struggling management. 269 Finally, the lack of a
disproportionate affect on out-of-state businesses may render Com-
merce Clause scrutiny inappropriate since the controversy can be re-
solved through the political process.270
Under the current test used by the United States Supreme Court,
examining the E.S.A. under the Contract Clause may also be inappro-
priate because of distinctions between the E.S.A. and the Pension Act
in Allied which indicate that the former should not fail.271 The E.S.A.
combats a larger social problem and benefits a larger class of people
than did the stricken Pension Act.272 These two advantages of the
E.S.A. obviate the possible flaws of no phase-in period, no termination
date, and no previous history of regulation in the area because their
application would contradict the wide ranging effect of legislation of
this type.273
Furthermore, the majority approach in Allied may not extend be-
yond that case.274 Should the dissenting view prevail, the Contract
Clause would not play any part in the dispute over the E.S.A. because
the additional burdens contained therein would not be considered im-
pairments of contract.275 To impair a contract according to the dissent,
the legislation must suspend or nullify an existing term of the contract,
therefore, upsetting expectation interests would be insufficient to raise
the Contract Clause objection.276
In contrast with the clear majority and dissent approaches available
under the Contract Clause, the Court has not delineated a settled
method to use in Taking Clause cases.2 77 Nevertheless, legislation like
266. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
267. Id
268. RaymondMotor, 434 U.S. at 441. See supra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 145-212 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 145-170 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 172-198 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 203-230 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 203-230 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
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the E.S.A. should not be defeated by Taking Clause arguments because
the circumstances prompting its enactment point to businesses as the
entities that, in all fairness, should bear the cost of the regulations.278
The burdens imposed by the E.S.A., moreover, are not excessive inter-
ferences with property that require compensation.279 Although the
twelve month notice requirement is not an excessive interference with
property, the notice requirement could be altered to allow businesses
more flexibility and still protect their workers from unfair manipula-
tion. To require notice concurrent with the decision to reduce opera-
tions with a three month minimum period would balance more
equitably the competing interests, and reduce the threat of a Taking
Clause argument.28 °
Therefore, the only reasons to reduce the proposed burdens on busi-
nesses lie in the realms of economics and politics, both of which are left
for others to debate. The E.S.A. died in the California Assembly this
year; however, the principles for which it stands are likely to be resur-
rected until they eventually are accepted.28  The magnitude of the
problem, the lack of accountability by big businesses, and the unwill-
ingness of Californians to undertake additional tax burdens leave no
more suitable alternative than to force companies to lend a hand; un-
fortunately, the loud trumpeting of frightened businesses currently
overwhelms the mild voice of reason, and may do so for some time.282
This comment does not oppose a national solution to the problem, and
some have been proposed;2 3 nevertheless, in the absense of a foresee-
able Congressional response, the states should take it upon themselves
to pass appropriate measures.
David Kenneth Huskey
278. See supra notes 239-255 and accompanying text.
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